Despite recent strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities by Israel, questioning has been raised regarding the credibility of Israel’s reasons for initiating the attack. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s longstanding rhetoric about Iran’s perceived imminent nuclear threat has often been met with resilient skepticism. Even upon presenting new alleged evidence of Iran’s potential nuclear weapon development to America, the reception remained dubious. However, what has proven difficult to ignore is the question of Iran’s purpose for producing a significant quantity of highly enriched uranium recently, if not for nuclear weaponry.
The abnormality of a nation without a nuclear arsenal enriching uranium to a 60 percent of U-235, an isotope concentration near the 90 percent level considered ‘weapons-grade,’ has caused suspicion. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s recent reports detailing a substantial increase in the production of sensitive fissile materials along with a general lack of transparency from Iran further ignite these concerns. Many observers have reached a rather simple conclusion from Iran’s actions: it seems likely Iran intends to acquire nuclear weapons and it’s only a matter of time before their plans reach fruition.
The actual scenario, however, points towards a far more intricate narrative underlying Iran’s decisions. Iran’s ploy of accumulating highly enriched uranium appears more as a strategy to gain advantage in negotiations with the United States than a clear sign of an immediate intent to develop nuclear weapons. This year, the situation has grown remarkably critical as Iran is confronted with the possible reimposition of ‘snapback’ sanctions and a weakening strategic position without a new agreement.
By enhancing enrichment speed and transitioning towards a ‘latent nuclear state,’ Iran potentially overstepped, which now leaves it struggling to adapt to its ill-executed coercive strategy. The withdrawal of the United States from the Iran Nuclear Agreement in 2018 under President Trump left Iran with scarce options to retaliate. Although a restrained response of condemning Washington’s breach and maintaining their end of the agreement was possible, it carried long-term risks of projecting the Iranian regime as weak as well as continuing to damage its economy with substantial American sanctions.
Alternatively, Iran could adhere to the enrichment limits agreed upon and lean on the other participants – United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China – to counteract the pressures exerted by the United States. Iran pursued this strategy till early 2019 but found little respite from Trump’s relentless ‘maximum pressure’ policy – American secondary sanctions still loomed large over non-U.S. entities, stymieing relief efforts for Iran’s crippled economy.
In the face of 2019’s gradually escalating constraints, Iran began progressively breaching these restrictions. This calculated approach encompassed a range of actions: surpassing the imposed 3.67 percent limit of enrichment, accumulating more low-enriched stocks than permitted, and deploying advanced centrifuges against the original agreement’s stipulations. Iran found itself at a crossroads when small escalations failed to deter Washington – whether to back off or intensify the situation further.
If Iran chose to escalate, it would breach the enrichment limits to the extent of becoming a ‘threshold’ or ‘latent’ nuclear power – a state capable of producing nuclear weapons rapidly while not possessing them. Interestingly, Iran anticipated this latent capability might press the United States into resuscitating the agreement or even committing to a new deal. The nation began moving towards nuclear latency in 2021, enriching uranium to 20 and 60 percent and progressively amassing stocks into 2022, 2023, and 2024.
Iran has hardly been subtle about their intentions as exemplified by the statement of the former head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran in 2024, comparing their technological capacity with having the necessary components to construct a car. By 2025, Iran likely felt a new urgency to reach nuclear latency. The year marked the 10th anniversary of the Iran nuclear deal’s implementation, when many restrictions would be lifted. Also, it was the signatories’ deadline to activate the ‘snapback’ mechanism to reimpose the original U.N. Security Council sanctions, provided Tehran failed to comply with its obligations.
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom had already signaled that in absence of either a renewed agreement or compliance, they would resort to this mechanism to reintroduce the sanctions. Tehran desperately sought to evade this outcome, as its role would legitimize Western multilateral sanctions again and diplomatically isolate Iran even further. Despite the direct economic impact likely being limited, it would diminish Iran’s negotiation position substantially, lowering chances of dealing with the sanctions that hurt Iran the most: the primary and secondary sanctions from America.
Caught between a rock and a hard place, Iran ramped up its stocks of 60 percent enriched uranium to over 400 kilograms – an increment of almost 134 kilograms in only three months. Put simply, this material could produce nearly nine nuclear weapons if further enriched to 90 percent, an operation that would take about three weeks in the Fordow enrichment plant. The estimated ‘breakout time’ was merely a couple of days.
Simultaneously, anxieties were growing over Iran potentially experimenting with enrichment levels over 60 percent, clandestinely stockpiling centrifuges, conducting possibly bomb-related computer simulations, and exhibiting inadequate transparency over nuclear activities at several unidentified locations. In retrospect, Iran might have misjudged what could be an ideal balance between standing firm and exercising restraint in its coercive strategy, underestimating Israel’s willingness to launch a preemptive strike and persuading the Trump administration to follow suit, even amidst ongoing negotiations.
Iran is now left with scant preferable options after the failure of its coercive strategy to force the United States into a new deal. Depending on their potential to quickly develop nuclear weaponry as a means to pressure Washington is likely now deemed unviable: given their recent actions, the United States, including Israel, is highly unlikely to tolerate any Iranian enrichment. This would invalidate their earlier justifications for their pre-emptive attacks.
Regrettably, these attacks might empower Iranian extremists who, claiming the ‘hedging’ method failed, may argue that crossing the nuclear threshold and establishing a robust nuclear deterrent, akin to North Korea in the 2000s, is the only option left. Even as Iran’s recently announced suspension of collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency may act as yet another strategic card, it could in turn accelerate covert activities towards weaponization. In such a scenario, 2025 may be remembered not only as the year when Iran’s diplomatic policy failed, but also as a year when options for diplomatic resolution were overlooked, leading to potentially the tenth addition to the contemporary club of nuclear-armed states.
The post Israel Strikes Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Amid Rising Tensions appeared first on Real News Now.
About Author
