In 1981, a groundbreaking piece titled ‘Preventing Nuclear War’ was published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists by Roger Fisher, a Harvard Law professor. Fisher, whose career gravitated around intense situations of high stakes, throws light on the potential catastrophe of a nuclear war. His proposition for decreasing the likelihood of a nuclear assault is fascinatingly straightforward: ‘Implant the critical code number in a tiny capsule, and position it near a volunteer’s heart.’
This method, akin to the routine exchange among military staff of the ‘nuclear football’ containing the nuclear launch codes, keeps the code-keeper in close proximity to the President. Fisher’s concept, known as the ‘Fisher Protocol,’ starkly highlights the chilling truth that the terrifying imagery of a nuclear war is often couched in sterile strategic lexicon. However, Fisher’s protocol remains just an idea, with no attempts at implementation, even symbolically.
As the Department of Defense pours $1.5 trillion into the refurbishment and modernization of our nuclear weapons and associated infrastructure, its perspective rests on the perception of nuclear deterrence as ‘wise.’ According to its viewpoint, the existence of multiple nations armed with nuclear weapons justifies the expansion of nuclear capacities. Consequently, more countries are building up their nuclear arsenals, with China expanding its armament more than twofold in the past half-decade.
Russia is another example of a nation focusing on the enhancement of its nuclear stockpile. It has successfully launched what the U.S. military believes to be an anti-satellite missile with nuclear capabilities, sometimes referred to as ‘Sput-nuke.’ In late 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin effectively reduced the barriers to utilizing nuclear weapons. Amid this changing landscape, the New START treaty, the only existing nuclear nonproliferation pact between the U.S. and Russia, is due for expiration in February.
As international alliances involving the U.S. grow weaker, countries such as South Korea, Germany, and Saudi Arabia, incapable of nuclear power but in the vicinity of nuclear-armed countries, might consider acquiring such weapons out of a sense of national defense necessity. Experts have indicated that recent attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities could possibly intensify their nuclear intentions. North Korea, which has been spared bombings, serves as a somber reminder.
Eight decades have lapsed since the world witnessed the cataclysm of the nuclear attack during the war for the first and only time. Notwithstanding the success of the policy of deterrence, as per the Nuclear Matters Handbook of the D.O.D., there is also the element of pure chance. The list of individuals with access to nuclear weapons over the years includes some whose judgment may be questionable.
Around the Cold War, the U.S. operated a radar detector in Greenland. Fearing Soviet interference, the U.S. would routinely station a B-52 carrying nuclear bombs near Greenland, tasked with alerting for potential attacks. In an incident in 1968, an unexpected fire onboard a B-52 led to the crew abandoning the aircraft, which eventually crashed and blew up on the ice. Thankfully, the nuclear bombs onboard did not detonate.
Other pathways leading to unintended nuclear disasters have been highlighted by Sagan. The paranoia around a surprise attack can precipitate a preemptive attack, inadvertently sparking a war between two countries with no intent for conflict. Therefore, nations like China and India have adopted ‘no first use’ policies to mitigate this risk.
These conflicts may not always result from intentional actions but stem from errors or misinterpretations. Such instances may range from a radar misjudging a moonrise for a Soviet missile launch in Greenland in 1960 to accidents during maintenance, as seen with the explosion in the ICBM silo in Damascus, Arkansas, in 1980 or when live armed missiles were unintentionally loaded on an Air Force bomber in North Dakota in 2007.
Often, in false alarm situations or near misses, the gravity of the situation has been defused by human intervention or relationships. For instance, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy held unofficial meetings with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin which played a crucial role.
The disarmament process is much more than just reducing weapons. Even in the absence of any consensus, the discourse needs to be reinitiated, aiding in maintaining conversations and relations. Fisher, in his 1981 essay, pointed out few human aspects that add to the potential danger, including the quest to win, a notion he marks as more fitting in a sports contest than a nuclear conflict.
Fisher cautions, ‘Our aims are victory, power, and peace. The detonation of nuclear weapons will fail to serve any of these,’ While his well-placed connections in the Pentagon were initially horrified by his proposal of the surgically embedded nuclear codes and the ensuing ramifications. They expressed serious concerns suggesting that such a process might cloud the President’s judgment.
The Pentagon officers’ concern was knowing that the need to physically harm someone to gain the codes could cripple the President’s decision-making ability. This, they believed, posed a significant issue as it might deter the necessary push of the button. Thus, they reacted with pronounced alarm to Fisher’s idea, outlining the gruesome picture of blood-stained White House floor.
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