Discussions in Washington around future strategies surrounding the escalating situation across the Taiwan Strait are becoming increasingly divisive. The American stance primarily focusses on discouraging China from launching an assault on Taiwan, a strategy maintained through the last three presidencies. This approach can be broken down into three key elements: enhancing the defensive capabilities of Taiwan and the U.S., employing diplomatic channels to demonstrate U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s protection whilst assuring China that the U.S. is not advocating for Taiwan’s independence, and using economic means to slow down China’s military modernization. Nevertheless, this strategic triad does not have a straightforward application, as the balance between its elements significantly shapes deterrence tactics on the ground.
There is no shortage of viewpoints on how these three components should be balanced for maximum effect. Some suggest that diplomatic pressure, coupled with military restraint to prevent upsetting China, provides the best chance of keeping Beijing at a distance. A contrasting opinion insists that without a substantial boost to the U.S.’ military presence in Asia, any existing deterrent measures might crumble. A third strategy focuses on enhancing Taiwan’s own self-defense measures, complemented by offshore U.S. support. This approach aims to maintain effective deterrence while also lowering the potential for escalation.
Each of these proposed strategies has its merit, but they fail to address the core paradox of the U.S. approach towards Taiwan: the potential double failures of deterrence. Underreacting could tempt Beijing into thinking they can overrun Taiwan before the U.S. can intervene. On the contrary, an overreaction might convince China’s leaders that their only remaining avenue to unification is through force. To handle such a dilemma requires a considered approach that combines rearmament, reassurance, and restraint, without tipping too far towards either weakness or rashness.
The right combination of forward-deployed capabilities, diplomatic restraint, and selective economic interdependence can reinforce each other to sustain credible deterrence without unduly provoking China. So far, U.S. policy with respect to Taiwan has vacillated between stern transactionalism, evidenced by tariff imposition on most Taiwanese goods, and subtle reaffirmations of support for Taiwan.
In the meantime, efforts to improve the U.S. military’s position in areas close to Taiwan are ongoing, notably through expanded access to bases in the Philippines and bolstering capabilities in southwestern Japan and other parts of the western Pacific. Several sites closer to Taiwan, in locations like Cagayan and Isabela Provinces, have been secured in the Philippines through an advanced defense cooperation agreement.
A similar development is taking place in Japan. The U.S. managed to reach a restructuring agreement in 2023 to adjust the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa to better respond to potential conflicts. Additionally, the U.S. military has been increasing their joint defense exercises and upgrading integrated air and missile defense systems across allied territories. However, it’s clear that besides increasing the volume of these defenses, qualitative changes also need to be made to ensure the ability to prevent a forceful reunification of China and Taiwan.
Increasing Taiwan’s independent military capabilities, a long-standing U.S. policy, however, risks further provoking Beijing. Chinese officials worry that a militarily autonomous Taiwan might consider declaring independence. To strike the right balance between deterrence and provocation, the U.S. should focus on supplying Taiwan with capabilities that necessitate continued U.S. support. In line with this, the U.S. administration approved the sale of three advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems to Taiwan in 2024. These systems function most effectively with U.S. support.
A critical element of a successful deterrence strategy is offering reassurance to Beijing. This can be achieved by publicly criticizing any statements or actions made by Taiwan’s leaders that may insinuate support for independence. Simultaneously, the U.S. should continue pushing for multilateral consensus on peace in the Taiwan Strait among international players.
Demonstrations of joint international opposition to any unilateral actions that threaten peace in the Taiwan Strait were seen at gatherings such as the G-7 summit or the Munich Security Conference. The United States, along with other countries, mentioned that solutions must be non-violent. An agreement has been made clear that peaceful unification, given Taiwan’s consent, would be accepted by the international community.
Implementing changes in military strategy and diplomacy compared to economic strategy seems relatively less challenging. Economic pressures run the risk of weakening both deterrence and reassurance. Granting economic and diplomatic concessions that enhance the benefits China would reap from the status quo could effectively reassure Beijing. Stepping back from or reversing economic decoupling could be a good starting point.
A halt or reversal in economic decoupling could serve not only to ease Beijing’s fears of the U.S. intent to splinter or weaken China but also to prevent potential domestic unease that could undercut the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Of utmost importance, maintaining economic interdependence grants the U.S. immense leverage over China. Threatening more severe sanctions in case of a military confrontation could steer the Chinese economy towards a permanent decline.
To maximize deterrence against China, the U.S. should consider forming a coalition of nations ready to impose sanctions. The trend in Washington has been to interpret deterrence as maintaining a rigid, even aggressive, stance towards China. However, such gestures do not truly enhance Taiwan’s security.
Instead of grand, aggressive gestures, the U.S. should quietly invest in better military readiness and capacities, choose its words carefully, and work on preserving economic resilience and interdependence. The tension of deterrence—the ease with which it can veer towards provocation or idleness—necessitates such a calculated approach.
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