A key strategic choice by Israel’s intelligence agency, the Mossad, still echoes markedly today. As Iran’s Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, was compelled into exile in 1979, Mossad’s station chief, Eliezer Tsafrir, was navigating the chaotic setting of SAVAK, Iran’s secret police at the time. The revolution was already causing tremors throughout the streets of Tehran, with revolutionaries prominently armed and roaming freely. Amid the chaos, an anguished army general, desperate for escape, clung to Tsafrir.
Shapour Bakhtiar, the temporary prime minister during this period of turmoil, conveyed to Tsafrir a weighty request directed at Israel. It involved carrying out a lethal action against Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, then in exile near Paris. This proposition ignited intense conversations within the Mossad back in Tel Aviv. Not a year prior, Saddam Hussein provided an opportunity to the Shah for a similar course of action during Khomeini’s period of exile in Iraq – an offer that was not pursued due to misjudged risk appraisal.
Now standing at the crossroads of a similar proposition, Yitzhak Hofi, the director of Mossad, convened a meeting of senior authorities, including Iran’s chief analyst Yossi Alpher. Hofi started off by advocating against the proposed mission, citing moral objections to the assassination of foreign political personalities. Alpher details this stance in his memoir, Periphery: Israel’s Search for Middle East Allies.
A seasoned division chief of Mossad argued that Khomeini’s presence or absence wouldn’t significantly alter the rapidly evolving dynamics in Iran. He insisted Khomeini would be incapable of surviving long-term in Tehran, assuring the military apparatus, and SAVAK would effectively control his influence and the protesting clerics. Represented as being part of Iran’s past, Khomeini’s capabilities were overlooked, and the focus was placed instead on the perceived future of Iran.
Alpher pointed out the concerning lack of comprehensive intelligence on Khomeini’s ideologies and political goals. This lack of knowledge about Khomeini’s plans posed a striking unknown risk for an attempt on his life. Following hours of deliberation, the decision was made by Hofi, and Mossad decided not to intervene. Tsafrir conveyed this decision to Bakhtiar, emphasizing Israel’s position of noninterference in global affairs.
Two weeks after the Shah evacuated Iran, Khomeini boarded a plane headed for Tehran, where he was greeted by millions of supporters. Bakhtiar, in a significant move of symbolism, disbanded SAVAK. However, by February 11, his government, characterized by secular moderation, could not withstand the revolutionary pressures and collapsed. Concurrently, Iran began to rapidly spread its newly formed revolutionary ideology throughout the region.
This ideology was not entirely as its formulators envisioned, as narrated later by one of its founding members, Mohsen Sazegara, who referred to the emerging IRGC as ‘a monster’ instead of the intended force. Across several regional theaters such as Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, Iran continued to amplify sectarian strife, posed challenges to Western presence in the Gulf, and propagated its encirclement strategy against Israel through different proxies.
Ramifications of the Mossad’s decision in 1979 can be traced throughout multiple international incidents, ranging from the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires to recent activities in support of Hamas following October 2023. The rationale behind this strategic misjudgment can be attributed to Israel’s Periphery Doctrine, established in 1957, focusing on alliances with non-Arab regional entities against Arab nationalism.
The doctrine fostered a dynamic exchange of intelligence and development of infrastructural assets, such as energy establishments. As Iran catered to Israel with oil supplies and funded half of the Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline, there was a growing sense of confidence within the Mossad. This proximity to Iran gave rise to a belief among the senior Israeli officials that they had a profound understanding of Iran.
However, this focus on state actors led to the underestimation of the disruptive power of hardline ideology. This oversight became evident when about 600,000 sermon tapes of Khomeini, disseminated from France, permeated Iran. The significant influence of these tapes in shaping public sentiment and the direction of the revolution points to the broader critical role of non-state actors in shaping geopolitical realities.
The alternative historical trajectory, had Israel decided to eliminate Khomeini during his Parisian exile, continues to be a matter of debate among former officials. Some contended that his removal could have prevented the revolution from unfolding or allowed secular moderates to steer Iran towards a path of a secular republic.
In the aftermath of the revolution, one thing is crystal clear: The birth of the Islamic Republic was neither a foregone conclusion nor predicted even by those close to the political drama. Echoing the same miscalculation that led to a refusal similar to the Shah’s earlier refusal of Saddam’s offer, the 1979 Mossad decision stands out.
The rapid unfolding of the Iranian Revolution caught many Western nations off guard, leading to a cautious approach towards disengaging from their past ally. In a response to the unexpected events, these nations sought reassurances from Khomeini regarding the preservation of a pro-Western military alignment and the continuation of oil supplies.
Tsafrir ruminated on this chain of events, questioning whether the world would have appreciated the consequences averted by eliminating Khomeini. His reflection left lingering questions on the implausible understanding of the gravity of the choices made during tumultuous times.
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